This paper, featured in IKN189 yesterday in the way seen below, deserves more eyeballs so it's here's on the open blog today, too. My thanks to reader CS for the headsup and here's the link you need to get your copy of the paper (or alternatively, this link).
Peru: A paper on
Shougang Iron provides country FDI insight
Your
author offers this link (16) (or this one
to reach abstract-plus-link page (17)) to a 27 page paper entitled “Chinese
Investment in Peru: A Comparative Analysis” dated December 2012 and written by Amos Irwin and Kevin P. Gallagher and published
by The Working Group on Development and Environment in the Americas (thanks to
reader ‘CS’ for the forward).
The main part of the investigation centres on examining
whether Shougang deserves its poor reputation with its workers, local community
and general public opinion in Peru and the empiricals are tested by comparing
Shougang to three other large mining concerns in the country, namely Antamina,
Yanacocha and Doe Run. With the investigation work done conclusions are reached
and then the argument is expanded to consider other aspects of the mining
industry in Peru. Below is one segment that probably most directly relates to
The IKN Weekly audience, but you are strongly recommended to download and read
the whole paper if the subject of political risk, community or worker relations
in Peru mining is of interest to you as it’s a very good and informative
report. Here’s the chosen extract.
Shougang’s Lessons for Peruvian
Mining FDI
There may not be any clear lessons
from Shougang that apply only to Chinese companies, but there are certainly
lessons that apply to Peru’s mining FDI in general. First, the improving
regulatory framework has helped to keep companies honest. Kotschwar et al.
conclude that the progress of the national regulatory framework has forced
companies to improve their social and environmental impact. (Kotschwar, Moran
et al. 2011) Many commented on the regulatory system’s positive impact on
Shougang. An NGO leader maintained that today, “new legislation and better
regulation have forced the company to make adjustments to survive.” (NGO
Official 2011)
Second, while the Peruvian regulatory
framework has improved greatly since the 1990s, two salient labor issues are
subcontractors and government resolution of union negotiations. Since MINEM and
MTPE have not agreed on the appropriate use of subcontractors, their conflict
leaves unions, mining communities and NGOs outraged at the widespread
outsourcing of what used to be decently-paid company jobs. Second, MTPE, which
is supposed to be the ultimate mediator in union-company disputes, is not an
effective mediator because locals see it as being in league with the companies.
In Shougang’s case, the unions point out that regional office of MTPE ignores
the union’s list of demands and simply forces the company to give a slightly
higher raise and onetime bonus. (Shougang Union Delegation 2011)
Finally,
the underlying problem facing all mining companies in Peru is the population’s
lack of confidence in the government ministries that regulate these companies.
Unlike workers, nearby communities often have no stake in the mining
operations. When they feel that a company is damaging the environment, they
attempt to shut down its operations. These communities do not trust the
environmental impact evaluations, third party audits, or other inspections that
private consulting firms prepare for MINEM. At the same time, local government
and community officials have no means of challenging problematic mining
operations. The government must give these communities a potent legal channel
through which they can air their grievances. While community accountability
will result in the end of some mining concessions, it is necessary to provide
this avenue inside the system rather than forcing citizens to take matters into
their own hands